條件式入學

          論中共之核武發展 論中共之核武發展： 四十年核武發展之回顧 On China’s Nuclear Weapons Development: a retrospective study on its 40 years’ development 鄭大誠 Ta-chen Cheng 前言 Introduction 在後冷戰時期「軍事事務革命」重視常規武器的風潮下，核武及其戰略之相關議題在許多人看來似乎已經不再是顯學，甚至已乏人問津。雖然如此，不可否認的是，所有現存的核武國家仍然保有著相當比例的核武，同時在可見的未來，這些國家也沒有完全廢棄核武的計劃。以中共的例子來說，中共雖然目前約僅有四百件核武，不過其核武本身以及其載具的更新卻仍是在不斷地進行當中；中共雖然對外供稱「不首先使用核武」，但卻也在其解釋上存有許多但書與矛盾。中共強硬派軍人對於核武運用的主張更是難以想像。吾人因而甚至不能確信如果未來台海爆發大規模的軍事衝突時，中共是否會使用核武。對於直接處於中共軍事威脅的台灣來說，研究中共的核武發展與趨勢特別具有其必要性。 The issues of nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons are not viewed by many as a live strategic issue in the post-Cold War period where the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has led to the “transformation” of conventional weapons systems. Even so, the fact cannot be denied that all existing nuclear powers still retain their nuclear stockpiles and refuse to scrap them in the foreseeable future. In terms of China, although the Chinese currently stabilise their nuclear stockpile to a level around 400 weapons, they never stop upgrading their nuclear capacity. The No-first-use (NFU) principle was said to be accepted by the Chinese government, but there are too many reservations and contradictions in its contents, which increased scepticism. Meanwhile, the occasional remarks by the Chinese hawkish generals furthermore gave the outside world an impression that the Chinese use of nuclear weapons will not be as restrained as claimed. For the Taiwanese people who are under China’s direct military threat, it is of particular importance to study China’s nuclear weapons development. 中共做為一個新興軍事強權，外界對於其國防態勢與兵力發展的興趣可想而知，不過長久以來對於其核武發展總是因為資訊的封閉而無法做完整的審視。有鑒於此，本文遂旨在以歷史檢視的方式將目前有關於中共核武發展的公開資料做一全面整理與分析，尤其是在其性能方面就不同來源選擇出較為可信的資訊與數據。在研究標的上以硬體（核武本身及其載具，尤其是彈道飛彈）為主，並不論及中共核武戰略、與其他國家的核武關係以及具體核武部隊的指管通情系統等。同時由於篇幅限制，在個別武器的深度探討上或有不足，亦請讀者原諒。 As a new military power, China’s defence posture and force development unsurprisingly have attracted much attention. However, due to the lack of information, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive investigation on China’s nuclear weapons. In this article, the author tries to develop a coherent account on this subject by searching all possible available materials. The data and information on the performance of delivery vehicles and weapons will be carefully scrutinised and selected. Yet the discussions on Chinese nuclear str 西裝外套ategy, its nuclear relations with other powers, and the nuclear C4 will not be included. Insufficient space will also prevent the author from focusing on a particular field. 中共核武發展的濫觴 The Beginning of China’s Nuclear Development 雖然毛澤東早期曾明白地斥指原子彈不過是「紙老虎」，不過在他了解了原子彈的深層政治與戰略意涵後，他倒是很快地決定要將中共有限的資源投入原子彈的研製。從一九五一年起，北京就與莫斯科簽訂了一系列有關協助中共研製原子彈的秘密協定，其中包括了原型彈、相關技術以及專業人員之轉移等等。數以百計的中共科學家也在莫斯科的杜伯納核子研究所受訓。[1] 赫魯雪夫上台後，雖然因早期鞏固政權的需要而繼續給予中共核技術援助，不過赫氏並沒有同意直接提供中共核武，他甚至直指蘇聯的核武保護傘已足以保護中國大陸。原子彈發展需要耗費太多金錢，中共實在應該把有限資源放在經濟發展上。[2] 在中蘇關係決裂後，蘇聯更是在一九六○年前撤出了所有對中共之核武計劃援助。[3] Although Mao Zedong had manifestly despised the US atomic bombs as a “paper tiger”, he did not hesitate to pour China’s limited resources into nuclear development when he discovered the political and strategic implications of nuclear weapons. To help the Chinese, Moscow signed a series of secret agreements with Beijing from 1951 and thereafter supplied the Chinese with many significant nuclear technological transfers including prototypes, expertise and professionals. Hundreds of Chinese scientists were also trained in Moscow’s Dubna Nuclear Research Institute. Khrushchev, however, did not approve Mao’s request on direct nuclear weapons transfers. The Soviet leader also asserted that the USSR nuclear umbrella was strategically sufficient to cover China. The atomic bomb would cost too much for China, which had better devote its resources to economic development. As a result of the acrimonious split between the Russians and Chinese, however, the Kremlin withdrew all its technical assistance from China by 1960. 不管有沒有蘇聯的幫助，中共亟欲成為一核武國家的決心是十分堅定的。毛澤東在一九五五年一月十五日的中央書記處擴大會議當中初步做成了研製原子彈的決議，[4] 核武發展也被列入一九五六年九月中共八大的十二年科學計劃當中。[5] 經過數年戮力發展，[6] 一九六四年十月十六日，也就是赫魯雪夫倒台的兩天後，中共成功地在新疆羅布泊試爆了首枚原子裝置。這枚原子裝置設計雖非十分精密，不過其威力足以摧毀敵人一些都市以及其他戰術性目標。聯合國原子能委員會後來估計這枚裝置約有兩萬噸當量，其威力大概略同於美國在一九四五年八月九日於長崎所引爆的第二枚原子彈。[7] 中共在一九六七年六月十七日，也就是在首枚原子裝置試爆後的兩年八個月後，又成功試爆了一枚三百萬噸當量的氫彈，成為核熱俱樂部的一員。[8] 自此之後，中共賡續發展其核武能量。雖然進展緩慢，但卻也仍獲得了不少技術突破與提昇。  China’s determination to become a nuclear weapons state had been conspicuous, no matter with or without Russian help. On 15 January 1955, Mao had made the first decision to make atomic bombs in an enlarged meeting of the Central Secretariat. The nuclear devel 房地產opment schemes were also included in the Twelve-Year Science Plan, presented in September 1956 to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After years of efforts, in Lop Nor, Xinjiang Province, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, two days after the fall of Khrushchev. This device was not a delicate work, but could possibly destroy some urban centres or other tactical objectives of an adversary. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission later estimated it could be as powerful as 20 kilotons or about the power of the bomb exploded over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. On 17 June 1967, two years and eight months after the explosion of China’s first atomic bomb, the Chinese successfully tested a 3-megaton hydrogen bomb. Like other nuclear weapons states, China since then had persistently improved its nuclear and strategic capabilities and had achieved a series of military breakthroughs, though in a very slow fashion. 陸基核武 Land-based Nuclear Weapons 對像中國這樣一個發展中國家來說，要擁有完整而先進的各式核武不管在技術上或財政支出上都是相當困難的。職是之故，從一開始中共就選擇著重在陸基核彈道飛彈與火箭的發展。[9] 畢竟較諸昂貴的空基與海基核載具，陸基飛彈對於同時要維持一支龐大傳統兵力以應付「人民戰爭」的中共來說，是個較為經濟且實際的選擇。 For a developing country like China, to possess a complete nuclear triad would be financially and technologically difficult. Almost from the beginning, therefore, China had an imbalanced development in favour of land-based ballistic missiles or rockets. Compared with the expensive airborne and naval vehicles, land-based ballistic missiles were commonly regarded as a much cheaper and more practical delivery system in China, which concurrently maintained massive conventional forces for a potential People’s War. 如同原子彈的發展一樣，蘇聯在核載具的發展經驗也深深地影響了中共。中共在一九五六年獲得了一批蘇聯製R-1飛彈。事實上，該型飛彈在構造上乃翻製自二次大戰末期使用低溫液態燃料的德製V-2火箭。一九五七年或許是中共在其戰略武器外購史上最重要的一年。在毛澤東第二次訪問莫斯科後，中共與蘇聯簽訂了一有關新型火箭與航空方面的援助協定。根據十月十五日的新國防技術協定，赫魯雪夫同意派遣一支配有兩枚R-2(SS-2)飛彈以及相關發射設備的陸軍飛彈營到中國，協助中共發展製造、測試與發射飛彈的能量。蘇聯還派遣了不少飛彈專家幫助中共建立飛彈相關工業，中共後來並追加訂購了十二枚R-2飛彈。這象徵了中共彈道飛彈發展的濫觴，被稱為「一○五九計劃」。[10] Similar to the development of the atomic bomb, the Soviet experiences on nuclear delivery systems deeply influenced the Chinese. In 1956, China obtained its first models, the Soviet R-1 missiles, which were literally copies of the German cryogenic liquid-propellant V-2 rockets used in World War II. 1957 was perhaps the most fruitful year in China’s acquisition history of strategic weapons. Mao Zedong’s second visit to Moscow was followed by an agreement for new rockets and aviation assist 租房子ance. Under the New Defence Technical Accord of 15 October, Khrushchev sent an Army missile battalion with two R-2 missiles (SS-2), and their associated launching equipment to China for manufacturing, testing, and launching purposes, with Soviet missile engineers helping China set up its missile industries. China later purchased 12 more R-2s. This marked the beginning of China’s ballistic missile project, which was now called the 1059 programme. 中蘇關係在一九五八年後急遽惡化。赫魯雪夫逐次停止了對中共有關原子彈與飛彈技術與資料的援助計劃、廢止了兩國科技的轉移協定，最後更撤回了所有在中國的蘇聯專家。沒有了蘇聯的協助，中共幾乎難以繼續這些未完成的飛彈計劃。也因此，中共被迫必須採用土法煉鋼或是逆向工程的方式來了解所進行計劃的相關技術。不過很不幸地，中共勞力密集的優勢並沒有辦法幫助於創造出新技術，一九五八年至一九六○年大躍進的失敗更是使各項核武發展計劃雪上加霜。[11] Sino-Soviet relations had considerably deteriorated by 1958. Khrushchev withheld plans and data for the atomic bomb and missiles, abrogated the agreements on transferring technology and eventually withdrew all Soviet advisers. Without Soviet help, the Chinese could barely continue their incomplete missile programmes. The Chinese were therefore forced to adopt indigenous methods or reverse engineering approaches in order to figure out these technologies. Unfortunately, China’s labour-intensive advantage did not help to create new technologies, particularly during the rash Great Leap Forward period (1958-1960). 在此種窘境下，中共即使要發展陸基核飛彈亦是困難重重。以下就略將中共數十年來發展陸基核武，尤其是陸基彈道飛彈的過程與成果分為四個階段。要特別說明的是，此種分類乃是基於國外觀察而加以認定。雖然沒有經過中共官方承認，不過還是頗能幫助了解中共核武發展的歷程。 In such a situation, China’s development of land-based nuclear weapons has been far more difficult than that of other countries. In the following pages, the author tries to divide the development of China’s nuclear weapons, particularly the land-based weapons into four generations by a generally accepted western standard. This classification is essentially from an external rather than an official perspective, but it can somehow help to understand such development. 一、第一代核飛彈 1. First Generation Missiles 在蘇聯援助的基礎上，中共經由一批留學外國的科學家如錢學森的積極參與，自一九五○年代後期開始發展了自己的飛彈工業。中共在一九六三年決定要在八年內建造四種不同彈道飛彈（「八年四彈」）。一九六四年更具體指出了四彈的假想目標，包括日本（東風二型，CSS-1）、菲律賓（東風三型，CSS-2）、關島（東風四型，CSS-3）以及美國本土（東風五型，CSS-4）。[12] 這「四彈」加上東風一型與巨浪一型潛射飛彈被視為中共的第一代核彈道飛彈。[13] 除了巨浪一型之外，其他飛彈都採用液態燃料，同時還具有許多子型。東風五型與東風四型的一種子型為洲際彈道飛彈。 With the help of the USSR and Western-trained scientists like Qian Xuesen, China began its missile programmes from the late 1950s. In 1963, Chin 濾桶a decided to build “four types of missiles in eight years.” The assigned targets in the draft plan formulated in 1964 were Japan (the DF-2, CSS-1), the Philippines (the DF-3, CSS-2), Guam (the DF-4, CSS-3), and the continental US (CONUS) (the DF-5, CSS-4). Together with the DF-1 and JL-1 (CSS-N-3), these missiles were viewed as China’s first generation of ballistic missiles. All were liquid-propellant guided missiles with many variations except the JL-1. The DF-5 and a variant of the DF-4 were intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 東風一型實際上是德製V-2火箭的一種改良型，由於性能較差，沒有什麼嚇阻價值。東風一型曾在一九六○年進行測試，不過並未部署。[14] 東風二型飛彈由蘇聯製「訟棍」飛彈(SS-2)複製而來。中共在一九六四年六月二十九日曾經進行了一次成功測試，不過要等到一九六六年十月二十七日中共才首次在東風二型飛彈上配掛了一枚約有兩萬至三萬噸當量的核彈頭進行發射測試。[15] 東風三型與東風四型飛彈在設計上深受蘇聯影響，尤其是在導向與推進系統方面。 東風三型原本是要發展成具有一萬公里射程的洲際飛彈。推進燃料將採用液態氧與煤油混合燃料，與蘇聯製R-7飛彈(SS-6)類似。不過由於技術上與經濟上的問題使然，中共被迫取消了東風三型洲際飛彈計劃，東風三型因而變成了單節式，僅有三千公里射程的中程飛彈。[16] The DF-1 was actually a revision of the German V-2 rocket, and had little strategic value in terms of deterrence. It was tested in 1960, but was not deployed. On 29 June 1964, China conducted a successful test of the DF-2, essentially a copy of the Soviet Shyster (SS-2), but it was not until 27 October 1966 that China launched a DF-2 missile armed with a 20-30 kilotons warhead for the first time. The designs of the DF-3 and DF-4 were also highly influenced by the USSR, especially in the guidance and propulsion subsystems. The DF-3 was at first aimed to have a 10,000-kilometre range, adopting the liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants used in the Soviet R-7 (SS-6) missile. However, technical obstacles and the economic crisis forced the cancellation of the DF-3 ICBM plan, and the DF-3 became a single-stage 3,000-kilometre range medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). 東風三型中程飛彈原本的假想攻擊目標是美軍在菲律賓的克拉克空軍基地以及蘇比克灣海軍基地。在一九六九年珍寶島危機後，中共遂將東風三型部署在中蘇邊境上，並將飛彈藏在河谷及洞穴等隱密地點以躲避偵察與被攻擊。據估計，東風三型的射程足以攻擊蘇聯中部與東部的目標。為了彌補精準度不足的缺點，東風三型配載了高當量核當頭。中共在一九八○年代大約部署了一百枚東風三型飛彈。東風三型的改良型東風三A型射程約有二千八百公里，在一九八六年正式服役。[17] The original assigned targets of the DF-3 were two US military installations in the Philippines: Clark Air Force base and Subic Bay naval base. After the Sino-Soviet military confrontation over the Ussuri River in 1969, the missiles were deployed along the borders with Russia. The sites were hidden in valleys and caves to make detection and targeting difficult. It was estimated that the DF-3 could hit targets in the Central and Eastern USSR. To make up for inaccu 酒店經紀racy and small numbers of warheads, the DF-3 used comparatively high yield warheads. There were approximately 100 DF-3 missiles deployed in the 1980s. The DF-3A, an improved variant with a range of 2,800 kilometres, entered service in 1986. 東風四型是中共首種利用地下發射井發射之飛彈。飛彈本身在點火前會被升至地面，這點與美軍早期的「泰坦」與「大力神」飛彈極為類似。部署在洞穴內的東風四型則是在滾移出洞穴至發射台後再灌加燃料與發射。東風四型原本是要設計來攻擊美國在關島的安德森空軍基地，不過在一九六九年後，中共將東風四型飛彈的射程增加到四千七百五十公里。[18] 如此一來，蘇聯的許多城市，包括莫斯科都會在東風四型的射程之內，東風四型也因此被稱為「莫斯科飛彈」。東風四型後來被發展成射程有一萬公里的洲際飛彈，彈體可配載一枚一至三百萬噸當量的核彈頭，不過觀察家卻很少注意到這個發展。東風四型洲際飛彈已可以攻擊中東、蘇聯歐洲地區以及阿拉斯加，不過卻沒有辦法攻擊美國本土的大部分。東風四型在一九七○年首次測試，並自一九七七年後開始部署。[19] The DF-4 was the first Chinese missile deployed in underground silos. It was raised to surface level before firing, much like the early US Titan and Atlas. The cave-deployed versions were designed to be rolled out from their tunnels to launch pads, fuelled, and fired. The original design goal for the DF-4 was to be able to strike the US Andersen air base at Guam. After 1969, the range of the DF-4 was increased to 4,750 kilometres, bringing Soviet cities, in particular, the Soviet capital, within its orbit so that the DF-4 was referred to as the “Moscow missile”. The DF-4 was developed as China’s first ICBM with an approximate range of 10,000 kilometres and probable payload of 1-3 megatons, but few analysts took notice. It could strike the Middle East, European USSR and Alaska, but not the US proper. The DF-4 was tested in 1970 and deployed from 1977. 東風五型常與蘇聯製笨重的SS-18飛彈相提並論，乃是中共為了用來攻擊美國而發展的洲際飛彈。東風五型採用四氧化氮做氧化劑，使用質輕的鋁銅合金做彈體，並配有先進的陀螺儀來增加精準度。[20] 中共在一九七八年一月到一九八一年九月間並無從事太空發射，外界認為中共乃利用這段時間進行東風五型的發射實驗。中共在一九七九年至少進行了四次短程測試，並在一九八○年五月進行了兩次由甘肅雙城子至太平洋的長程測試。其中一次飛行了九千七百公里，落點可能在吉爾伯特群島、所羅門群島、斐濟以及新赫布里底之間的海域。[21] 在數次失敗測試後，中共也藉由民用長征二號火箭的設計賡續研發東風五型飛彈。自一九八三年起，中共開始發展配有多目標獨立重返大氣層能力彈頭的升級型東風五A型飛彈，射程增加為一萬三千公里，可攜重三千至三千二百公斤，並裝配有更精準的導向系統。[22] 毫無疑問地，東風五A型飛彈在性能上已屬於第二代飛彈，其攻擊目標可達俄羅斯、歐洲、澳洲以及美國本土。[23] The DF-5 ICBM, being compared to the heavy Soviet SS-18, was China’s main ICBM asset against the US. With nitrogen tetroxide as the oxidiser and a lightweight, aluminium-copper alloy airframe, the DF-5 was equipped advanced gyroscopes for greater accuracy. The absence of space launches between January 1978 and September 1981 may have related to the experimental DF-5 t 租屋ests. Four partial range tests were reported in 1979. Two long range shots were made from Shuangchengzi, Gansu Province, into the Pacific Ocean in May 1980. It was reported that one of them had travelled approximately 9,700 kilometres to an area bounded by the Gilbert Islands, the Solomons, Fiji, and the New Hebrides. Following several flight test failures, China continued the D-5 development by dint of its development of the civilian Long March 2 rocket. Beginning in 1983, the Chinese began to develop the upgraded DF-5A with MIRVed warheads, with a range of over 13,000 kilometres, carrying from 3,000 to 3,200 kilograms and a more accurate guidance system. There was little doubt that the DF-5A, which could literally viewed as a second generation missile, possessed the capacity to strike targets in Russia, Europe, Australia and the CONUS. 二、第二代飛彈 2. Second Generation Missiles 中共在一九八○年代中期已大致完成其第一代飛彈的部署。[24] 不過就實際核嚇阻功能而言，這些第一代飛彈僅具有中共之為一個核武國家的象徵意義。中共自製的高當量核彈頭由於不夠精準，因而只能配載在體積龐大的彈道飛彈或飛機上，不過這些飛彈的性能水準也僅略等於美國在一九五○、六○年代時所發展出的產品。因而第一代飛彈在使用、存活度以及可靠度上都十分值得懷疑。[25] In the mid-1980s, China had almost completed the deployment of its first generation nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in strict terms, the first generation weapons were merely a symbol of China’s nuclear power status. The unsophisticated and high yield warheads could only be carried by large ballistic missiles or aircraft, and the missiles were only roughly equivalent to the US products designed in the 1950s and 1960s. Their use, survivability and reliability were very questionable. 有鑑於此，自一九七○年代開始，中共就開始發展第二代核武，其發展重點在於縮小核武的體積與重量以及增加飛彈的靈活度與精準度。第二代核飛彈的研發約在一九九○年代末期完成，[26] 主要都是採用固態燃料，包括有東風二十一型(CSS-5)、東風二十五型、東風三十一型(CSS-9)、東風四十一型、東風五A型，以及巨浪二型潛射飛彈(CSS-NX-5)。其中東風三十一型、東風四十一型，以及東風五A型均為洲際彈道飛彈，有關巨浪二型潛射飛彈的討論則將留到海基核嚇阻的部分再行說明。 From the 1970s, in view of this, the PLA began to develop its second generation nuclear weapons, with the key objectives to minimise nuclear weapons, including their size and weight, and to increase mobility and accuracy. It was estimated that the R&D of such weapons was finalised in the late 1990s. The second generation were primarily solid-propellant missiles, including the DF-21(CSS-5), DF-25, DF-31(CSS-9), DF-41, DF-5A, and JL-2 (CSS-NX-5). The DF-31, DF-41 and DF-5A were ICBMs. The discussion of the JL-2 SLBM will be left to a later section on the sea-based deterrent. 東風二十一型為兩節式採用固態推進燃料中程飛彈，是中共首種真正具有道路機動性的飛彈。彈體置在直立式發射架運輸載具上，採用冷發射技術，亦即飛彈在彈射出去後才在空中點火。東風二十一型的子型東風二十一A型具有較輕之重量，射程略增至二千五百公里，[ 房屋出租27] 其可能用來攻擊蘇聯的城市地區。東風二十一A型在一九七八年開始發展，曾經在一九八五年成功測試。東風二十一型後來成為巨浪一型潛射飛彈的發展基礎。 The two-stage solid-propellant DF-21 medium-range missile was the first truly road-mobile Chinese missile, mounted on a transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle. It used a cold launch technique, i. e., it was ejected from its container and the engine ignited while airborne. The DF-21A variant reportedly had a decreased weight and a slightly longer range of 2,500 kilometres. Likely targets were urban areas in Russia. It was developed in 1978 and successfully tested in 1985. The DF-21 was later developed as the JL-1 SLBM. 東風二十五型飛彈可攜帶較大且較多彈頭，射程約一千八百至二千五百公里。東風二十五型後來改良為東風三十一型，為三節式機動洲際彈道飛彈。東風三十一型射程約有八千公里，雖然只能攜帶一枚彈頭，不過精準度可達三百至六百公尺。在最大射程範圍下，東風三十一型可以攻擊到夏威夷及阿拉斯加，不過卻無法射到大部分美國本土。東風三十一型也被用來瞄準俄羅斯及美國在亞洲的軍事基地及設施。已知東風三十一型最後三次試射在二○○○年十一月，試驗中還包括使用誘餌彈頭進行了較短程的飛行測試。第一個東風三十一型飛彈旅據悉已在二○○三年完成部署。[28] 目前中共可能已經部署了三個東風三十一型飛彈旅，未來還可能再部署三個旅。[29] 東風三十一型的改良型東風三十一A型射程可達一萬二千公里，[30] 可能會在二○○七至二○○九年達到初期部署。[31] The DF-25, with larger and multiple warheads, had a range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometres. It was further revised as the DF-31, a three-stage mobile ICBM. The range of the DF-31 was estimated at 8,000 kilometres with accuracy at 300-600 metres for its single warhead. At maximum range, the DF-31 was capable of hitting Hawaii and Alaska, but not the CONUS. The DF-31 would also be targeted against Russia and American bases and facilities in Asia. The last of three known DF-31 test flights was conducted in November 2000 and involved decoy warheads travelling over a shorter flight path. The first DF-31 brigade was deployed in 2003. There are now probably three missile brigades deployed, and there will be three more in the near future. China is also developing a modified version of the DF-31, the DF-31A, with an extended range of up to 12,000 kilometres. Its initial deployment could be 2007-9. 東風四十一型飛彈自一九七三年便開始發展，為三節式飛彈，前兩節採用東風三十一型設計，第三節則大幅加大，設計上頗類似美製義勇兵以及蘇聯製白楊SS-25飛彈。[32] 東風四十一型飛彈外型較東風三十一型大了許多，射程可達一萬二千公里。和東風三十一型不同的是，東風四十一型並非設計運用在潛艇上，而是以配載在陸上機動載具為主，並強調具有快速的攻擊火力控制系統。東風四十一型飛彈計劃在一九七五年九月被暫時中止，但在一九七八年八月又重新上馬，並更名為東風二十二型飛彈。東風四十一二十二型是中共所發展最後一種的液態燃料飛彈。不過中央軍委在一九八四年決定不再發展液態燃料，而全面發展固態燃料飛彈。東風四十一二十二型飛彈計劃在一九九五年被正式取消。[33] The DF-41 programme was initiated in October 1973, with a three-stage missile similar to the American Minuteman and the R 賣屋ussian Topol (SS-25) missiles by using the first two stages of the DF-31 along with a much larger third stage. It was in size larger than the DF-31, and had a range of up to 12,000 kilometres. Unlike the DF-31, the DF-41 was not constrained be fitted into a submarine launch tube. It was designed to be road-mobile, with a rapid targeting fire control system. The DF-41 programme was suspended in September 1975 but resumed in August 1978 under the new name of the DF-22. The DF-41/22 model was the last liquid-propellant missile of the PLA. However, the 1984 decision of the Central Military Commission made a change of development from liquid to solid-fuelled rocketry. In 1995, the DF-41/22 programme was cancelled. 三、第三代及第四代核武及其技術的發展 3. Third and Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons and Their Technologies 第三代及第四代核武技術的發展大多還在研發階段，外界對之知之甚少。不過據信，除了中子彈外，這些新核武或相關技術在近期應該都還未有部署或生產的可能性。根據已知的少數資料顯示，中共第三代核武的發展重點應該在提升彈頭性能、發展中子彈，以及研製利用核爆所產生的電磁脈衝及X光雷射武器。[34] 中共早在一九八○年代初期即有發展此類武器的興趣，在八○年代中期開始投入較多資金從事相關研究。中共目前似乎已經取得了一些成果。 The third and fourth generation missiles and associated technologies are mostly in the R&D process, and no many discussions can be found in public. It is generally believed that none of these, perhaps with the exception of the neutron bomb, would be deployed in the near future. Despite little disclosure, China’s third generation missiles research was aimed at upgrading warheads and developing neutron bombs, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and X-ray laser weapons pumped by a nuclear explosion. The initial interest appeared in the early 1980s, but it was only since the mid-1980s that the Chinese had poured more resources into these new fields. However, they seemingly had already obtained some results. 在第三代核武當中，中子彈的研製是最值得注意的。根據八一電台在一九八二年二月的一項報導，國防科工委所屬的一研究機構已經完成發展中子彈相關資料的研究。[35] 之後有關中子彈的測試消息就少有傳出。不過當一九九九年美國國會發表著名的《考克斯報告》後，中共政府立刻出人意料地宣稱他們早已擁有足夠的技術自行研製中子彈。[36] 在同一份聲明中，中共還指稱他們早已在一九八八年就已經試爆了一枚中子彈。[37] 《考克斯報告》認為，中共研製中子彈的原始目的應該是為了在其領土內遏制南侵的蘇聯裝甲部隊，不過該報告研判中子彈也可能在中共對臺行動中被用來做戰術性運用，藉以減少對敵方建物與裝備之損毀與破壞。[38] Among those new developments, the neutron bomb is the most noticeable. The Bayi Radio reported that in February 1982, a research institute under the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) had completed a study of data on the development of the neutron bomb. Further tests of neutron bombs were seldom mentioned, but in 1999, when the American Cox Report was released, the Chinese Government unexpectedly announced it possessed sufficient technology to produce neutron b 租房子ombs. The Chinese also claimed in the same statement that they had successfully tested a neutron bomb in 1988. The Cox Report judged that China probably originally developed the neutron bomb for use on its own territory against the invading Soviet forces. Such weapons could also be useful in a campaign against Taiwan to reduce physical damage. 除了中子彈外，中共也持續進行核彈頭縮小與升級之相關研究。在一九九六年正式簽署《全面禁止核試爆條約》之前，中共業已進行了一系列的新式核裝置，尤其是低當量核彈頭的試爆。舉例而言，自一九九二年九月二十八日至一九九六年七月二十九日之間（中共於一九九六年七月三十日宣佈不再進行核試爆），中共至少進行了八次低當量核裝置的地下測試。對照這些測試的結果與相對應的彈頭與飛彈資料，很明顯地，中共這些核試爆主要目的就是在為新一代的戰術型核武發展更小更輕的核彈頭。[39] In addition to new weapons, reducing and upgrading the warhead size were important tasks for Chinese nuclear scientists. During the l990s, China was working to complete tests of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. For example, from 28 September 1992 to 29 July 1996, the Chinese at least had conducted 8 underground tests. All were low yield nuclear devices. The Chinese announced they would stop nuclear tests from 30 July 1996. Based on what was known about Chinese nuclear testing practices, combined with data on Chinese warhead yield and missile development, it was clear that the main purpose of these tests was to develop smaller and lighter warheads for China’s new nuclear forces. 此外，根據美國國防部二○○五年對中共軍力的年度報告，中共很可能會在對臺軍事行動中利用高空核爆所產生的高空電磁脈衝來達到先期作戰的戰術性目的。高空電磁脈衝會造成高空大氣層的離子化，並大幅減弱敵方的作戰能力，尤其會造成通訊系統連接、雷達資料傳送以及電子光學偵測器的破壞。除軍事設備之外，民用的電力與運輸系統也可能會遭到中斷。在本質上，中共認為高空電磁脈衝雖為一種非傳統武器，不過此種武器並未越過核門檻，也不應該被美國或其他國家視為戰略性核武，勉強僅可被視為一種戰術型核武。不過美國卻不認為中共對此種高空核爆的使用能真如其宣稱可「戰術性」地限於臺灣及臺海地區。高空核爆所產生的電磁脈衝不僅會影響到臺灣地區，還會影響到中國大陸本身、日本、菲律賓以及附近海域，同時影響此區域的海空運輸與交通。[40] Moreover, according to the 2005 report on China’s military power by the US Department of Defense (DoD), China would consider using a high-altitude nuclear burst to generate high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) in order to meet tactical objectives at the first stage of its military campaign against Taiwan. HEMP causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as key communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Additional effects could include severe disruptions to civil electric/power an .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 買屋  .